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PARENTAL DESIRE FOR CONTROL OF JOINT VENTURES:
A CASE STUDY OF AN INTERNATIONAL JOINT VENTURE
Abstract
This paper provides an in-depth look at how parental desire for
control of an international joint venture changes over time. Past
literature addresses the partners' motivations at the time of for-
mation and is unrealistic for evaluating JVs that exist for a long
time period. The mechanisms for controlling the joint venture's stra-
tegic direction and management are examined by enumerating the types
of controls and by assessing their impact. The findings suggest that
more formal control mechanisms are not as influential as informal
controls and that the intensity of desire for control influences the
control mechanisms used.
The role of the partners in an international joint venture was
explored over its life of thirty years. Interviews were conducted
with managers of the 'partner firms, as well as with all the living ex-
presidents and current president of the joint venture. Publicly
available information and company documents were researched, and board
meeting minutes were examined for the last twenty years.

Recent theoretists and practitioners maintain that most firms would
prefer to enter a joint venture (JV) only as a last resort and will
attempt to have as much control as possible when forming the joint
venture (Harrigan, 1985; Hladik, 1985; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978;
Stopford and Wells, 1972; Van de Ven and Walker, 1984; Young and
Bradford, 1977). These scholars suggest that the parental desire for
control influences the parent firm's attempt to constraint and direct
the strategic direction of the JV. A joint venture is, by definition,
a separate organization that is formed by two or more parent firms for
more than a short duration of time. The control mechanisms such as
direct involvement in JV management decisions, in the allocation of
resources, and in social controls illustrate the desire for control by
the parents.
Issues of control are important because in order for the JV to
develop, it must be neither so tightly constructed that it cannot pur-
sue its mission nor so loosely constrained that it develops in undesired
directions (Prahalad and Doz, 1984). JV's have two or more parents who
have individual reasons for being involved in the JV and who have dif-
ferent levels of desire for control. As the JV matures, one parent
frequently becomes the dominant parent and controls the JV (Killing,
1982). Inherent in this maturation process are changes in parental
desire for control.
Using this premise as a basis for studying desire for control of
the parents of a JV, this study examined the changing parental patterns
of desire for control and of techniques used to control an international
JV. Most researchers to date have been concerned with reasons and
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mechanisras for formation of a joint venture by looking at the JV at
the point of formation. Longitudinal studies are rare. The present
study identifies and explores the important control issues over the
thirty-year life of the joint venture.
The joint venture (EIM) was formed in 1946 by three American (AMC,
PC, and Green) and four European firms. By 1976, PC had acquired more
than 95% of the JV although originally it had only 25% equity. This
study examines how PC's desire for control changed over time, how it
controlled the independence of the JV , and how well its control
mechanisms worked. A more detailed history is found in Appendix I.
The names of the firms and of the people have been changed in order to
comply with their requests for anonymity.
This study proposes to identify the various methods that are used
for control, to discuss the effectiveness of these methods by utilizing
a case study of an international joint venture as an example, and to
develop a theoretical framework that explains the extent to which a
parent firm has a strong desire to control a joint venture.
JV ACCOMPLISHMENT OF PURPOSE
The mission of the joint venture is initially determined by the
parent firms at the time of conception. Based on their own motiva-
tions, the parents determine the nature and extent of the initial
activities of the joint venture. These motivations or reasons for
formation range from political reasons, such as gaining power in a
country or gaining a political ally, to economic reasons, such as in-
creasing profitability or creating barriers to entry in the industry.
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to strategic reasons, such as improving the parent's long term via-
bility (Franco, 1971; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Young and Bradford,
1977).
JV MISSION
Accomplishing a mission is not easy or assured under normal con-
ditions: every business faces competition, changing environmental
conditions, and difficulties motivating people to work toward organi-
zational goals. Businesses address the problems of developing control
mechanisms aimed at achieving objectives, at creating structures and
policies that carry out the activities, and at strategic surveillance
(Newman, 1975). '
International joint ventures face additional sets of problems:
different international cultures, different parent firm cultures,
varying legislation governing operations and multiple political
environments. The complexities of doing business is greatly increased
for joint ventures and consequently, the difficulty of maintaining
their viability is also increased (Berg, Duncan, and Friedman, 1982).
An additional factor affecting the joint venture's ability to carry
out its mission is the characteristics of the people representing the
parents and the joint venture. The aspirations, perceptions, and
ability to interact with others are attributes of the leadership of
any organization and have a tremendous impact. These influence the
extent to which the parent firms have a strong desire to control and/or
to be involved in the joint venture (Doz and Pralialad , 1981; Fiol,
1986).
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NATURE OF JVs
Joint ventures are not independent entities: they must Interface
and Interact with the parent companies. Over time, the parent com-
panies face their own changing environmental and industry conditions,
go through their own stages of corporate growth, and face threats to
their corporate survival.
Some of the parents' goals may be in direct opposition to that of
the joint venture. Although the joint venture is formed by two or
more firms that agree at the time of formation about certain par-
ticulars, there may be mixed motives or hidden agendas even at the
point of inception (Lyles and Rajadhyax, 1985; Van de Ven and Walker,
1984). For example, the parents may want to acquire the skill or
knowledge of the other parent or want the joint venture only to be in
certain activities or certain markets. In assessing some parental
motives, Mendolia remarked "... more attention is given to narrowing
the scope of joint ventures than in establishing a climate for inde-
pendent activity" (1979, 819).
This study attempts to address the nature of a dynamic rela-
tionship between a joint venture and its parents in an attempt to
better understand questions of ownership and control of joint ven-
tures. It addresses the types of control that were used by the
parents over time and the changes that occurred. Nonetheless, it
only suggests a beginning point for research on the effect of parental
controls on joint venture success.
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CONTROL OF JOINT VENTURES
The ability to control the joint venture's direction will be deter-
mined by the contextual factors of the joint ventures, the parental
desire to control the JV, and the impact of the various devices used by
the parent to control. The JV is designed with certain influence fac-
tors that result from the context
,
such as technology, strategy, or
structure, as predetermined by the parents. However, these factors
influence how easy or difficult the JV is to control and they also
change over time. Authors such as Dunbar (1981), Jaeger and Baliga
(1985), Mintzberg and Waters (1984), Ouchi (1977, 1979) and Peterson
(1984) have written about control in organizations, and we assume that
the theoretical frameworks also apply to joint ventures.
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE
Desire for control is the degree to which the parent wants to
influence the strategic direction of the joint venture and to shape the
mission of the joint venture. Lorange (1984) refers to strategic
control as encompassing desire for control as well as the implementation
of the mission. Desire for control is influenced by the visibility or
importance of the JV within the parent firm, the degree of sophistication
of the parent in managing JV relationships, the changing developments
of the parent firm, and the personalities involved (Harrigan, 1985;
Schaan, 1985; Prahalad and Doz , 1984; Singh and Doz, 1983). This desire
for control changes as the parent firm develops.
FIGURE 1
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Control devices may be direct by participation in the board of
directors, by direct involvement in the selection or socialization of
the management, or by resource allocations in the form of monies,
expertise, or people (Newraann, 1975; Ouchi, 1977, 1979). Indirect
control mechanisms can also be used to influence the direction of the
JV by negotiating with the other partner firms outside the Board of
Directors' meeting, influencing host government requirements, with-
holding technical information, etc. (Harrigan, 1985; Hladik, 1985).
Actual control is the real amount of control exercised by the
parent firm. It is influenced by the effect of the context , the desire
for control and the control devices (Dunbar, 1981; Ouchi and Maguire,
1975). These control factors are interrelated and influence each other.
Thus, actual control is a function of the contextual factors, the
parental desire for control, and the impact of the control devices
used. Each of these will be discussed in more detail below.
CONTEXTUAL FACTORS
The organizational context determines the ease of control of the
JV. If it is easy to control, the parent will be able to establish
control devices such as rules, regulations, pricing procedures, and/or
clan mechanisms that will keep the joint venture meeting the parental
goals without too much difficulty (Doz and Prahalad, 1981; Oi.ichi, I'^SO).
Technology . The nature of the technology used will influence how
easy or difficult a joint venture is to control. If the parent con-
tributes its technological expertise and continues to invest in R&D
relating to the technology, it will have a high desire to control the
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JV In order to safeguard its technology (Ouchi, 1977). If the JV
develops its own technology or innovates, it will be harder to control.
However, there may be a strong desire for involvement by the parent in
order to have qviick access to information about any new developments.
Another important control consideration is the type of technology.
If the technology involves mass production that is relatively stable,
the joint venture will be easier to control. If, however, the JV
utilizes a craft technology or one with high task variability, it will
be harder to control. The more labor intensive the technology, the
harder it will be to control (Mintzberg, 1973; Ouchi and Maguire, 1975),
Structure . For our purposes, the particular features of structure
that are important to control of the joint venture are (1) the
reporting relationship to the parent and (2) the structural design of
the JV. Total agreement regarding the best reporting approach for
controlling a JV does not exist. It appears that if an international
JV interfaces with the International Division of the parent cor-
poration, the JV is allowed more autonomy and may, in fact, be easier
to influence because of better relations with the parent company
(Davidson and Haspeslagh, 1982; Doz and Pralahad , 1981). On the other
hand, if the JV reports to a product group, there will be higher
parental desire to control the JV but more conflict. If the JV has
only one function or one physical location, it would be easier to
control and if the JV is highly decentralized or differentiated, it
would be harder to control (Dunbar, 1981; Ouchi, 1977, 1979).
Environment . The environment can be rapidly changing and dynamic
requiring that the JV have the autonomy to make quick decisions. In
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this case, the JV would be harder to control from corporate headquar-
ters. Furthermore, an international JV operates in a foreign coramunity
where the local managers may have a better understanding of the
environmental conditions. On the other hand, if the JV operates in a
relatively stable environment where the market conditions are known and
the culture is understood by the parents, the JV will be easier to
control (Doz and Prahalad , 1981).
Strategy . A clear, unambiguous, and stable JV strategy will be
easier for the parent to control than one that is more emergent, ambigu-
ous, and produced cooperatively (Mintzberg and Waters, 1984;
Van de Ven and Walker, 1984; Rumelt, 1974). In the latter case the JV
management would be in a better position to interpret information,
assess opportunities and to move quickly. The momentum that is created
influences how easy the JV is to control: the more pervasive and
resistant to adjustments, the harder it will be to influence and to
cause a change in the JV strategy (Miller and Friesen, 1980).
Leadership . JV managers who are entrepreneurial, who closely iden-
tify with the JV, and who attempt to build a JV culture separate from
the parents are harder to control. Consequently, JVs that have manage-
ment who have a desire for autonomy, who develop a strategic orienta-
tion separate from the parents, who encourage the JV to develop its own
resources and who attempt to build an independent JV culture and coerce
the parents into it will be much harder to control (Harrigan, 1985).
DESIRE FOR CONTROL
Visibility . The more visible a joint venture is within the parent
company, the stronger will be the desire to control the joint venture.
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If the profits or sales of a product area within the parent company is
heavily determined by the joint venture, the more visible it will be.
If the JV has a different business orientation than the parent firm,
there will be less of a desire to control it. The closer the JV
mission and product lines are to those of the parent, the higher will
be the desire to control the JV by the parent. Similarly the higher
the strategic importance of the JV to the parent, the stronger will be
the desire to control the JV (Harrigan, 1985).
INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE
Sophistication . The amount of experience the parent has in
managing joint ventures will also determine the extent to which it has
a strong desire to control the JV: The less experienced, the higher
the tendency to want to control (Davidson and Haspeslagh, 1982).
Stages of Growth . The parent firm experiences its oi.m growth. It
confronts changing environmental and industrial conditions and changing
internal conditions in its own structure and strategy that can impact
parent's desire to control the JV. There will be confounding events,
acquisitions and divestments of other JVs or divisions, and governmental
demands. The method of interface of a foreign unit with the parent
company has been demonstrated as having important implications to how
the parent firm handles the foreign subsidiary (Prahalad and Doz , 1981).
Whether the JV reports to the parent firm's International Division or
the product area, the point of interface will impact the desire for and
the amount of control exercised over the JV.
FIGURE 2
PARENTAL
DESIRE FOR CONTROL
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Personalitles . One of the major determinants of a parent's ability
to control the JV is the leadership in both the JV and in the parent.
Parental management who strongly identify with their firms have a
lower likelihood of forming JVs and when they do, have a higher need
to control the JV and to be directly involved (Fiol, 1985).
DEVICES FOR CONTROL
Control devices are methods by which a parent firm can influence
and direct the goals of the joint venture and its management. These
include control through the board of directors, control through the
management, and control through resource allocations (Pfeffer and
Salancik, 1978). These represent the behavior and output controls
identified by Ouchi (1977) and Newman (1975) and also input controls
(Dunbar, 1981; Peterson, 1984).
Control via Board of Directors . By obtaining an equity position
in the joint venture, the parent has the right to exercise control at
the highest levels of the joint venture. The most important vehicle
for control is the number of votes that the parent firm has either
directly because of its equity position or indirectly because of its
ability to appoint people to the Board who will vote according to the
parent's wishes. Another method of control that the parent firm can
use is agenda setting for the Board of Directors' meetings. The
parent firm can lobby to influence the JV management or the other
parent firms, and it can meet with the other parent firms to determine
the agenda outside the official meetings. A third method of control,
an input device, is control over the official documents . By In-
fluencing what is written into the legal contracts and agreements, the
-13-
parenc firm can exercise a tremendous amount of control over the JV's
activities, its markets, the amount of revenue that it reinvested into
the JV , and how much is paid out in dividends or royalties.
Control through Management . Selection of the management involves
choosing people who will comply with the wishes of the parent company
and who will be familiar with the way the parent company operates.
Selection may be of the JV president, as well as other managerial
positions. Socialization is a very important control device which
establishes mutual understanding and shared cultures which serve to
guide the actions of the management (Ouchi, 1977; Jaeger and Baliga,
1985). Consequently, devices such as bringing the JV management
to the parent headquarters for training or part-time assignments serve
as a mechanism for controlling the behavior of those individuals in
the future. If the parent firm determines the methods of compensation
for the management (pay, bonuses, profit sharing, pensions, etc.),
this serves as a powerful control device. The last method of control
through the management is through agenda setting with the management.
This involves communicating directly with the management about the
intent of the parent.
Control through Resource Allocation . The parent firm can exert
control over the JV by controlling the monies that get allocated for
new projects, research and development, capital improvements, etc.
The parent firm may be involved in direct resource allocation control,
such as loans or direct Investments in the JV , or it may have indirect
control through having the right of approval outside the Board of
Directors on anv investment decisions. Expertise is another control
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device since the parent firm can give or withhold its expertise about
technological knowledge and research and development. The parent firm
can also control licensing arrangements. The last method of control is
people/time. The parent firm controls how many and which people are
sent as advisors or liasons with the joint venture and how much of their
time is allocated to the joint venture.
METHODOLOGY
This study describes the longitudinal study of an international
joint venture and develops a comprehensive understanding of the
factors affecting the ability of parents to control a joint venture.
An attempt was made to track the points in the history of the joint
venture that affected the control of the JV, to understand the method
of control, and to assess how these influenced the destiny of the
joint venture. The previous theoretical papers summarize the initial
framework used to guide the collection and verification of the data.
Grounded theory (Glaser and Strauss, 1967) was used to allow the
researcher to see if these theories applied to joint ventures and to
see if other contingencies applied.
Since the objective of this study was to develop an in-depth
understanding of the control relationship between a joint venture and
its parents, a case study approach was required. This study attempts
to develop a retrospective view of a longitudinal process in order to
examine the events that occurred and why. The control process itself
is lagged, meaning that although a control event may occur in Period
I, the full impact may not be evident until Period III. For these
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reasons , the methodology and sample size demanded an in-depth
investigation with a triangulation of data sources to validate and
clarify events and results.
Interviews were conducted with all living people who had served as
President of the JV, with ex-members of the Board of Directors from
the parent firms, and staff members of the focal parent firm. In all,
about 50 interviews were conducted in both the United States and in
Europe. These lasted an average of two hours or more. The companies
and people were very cooperative and allowed the researcher to return
several times for interviews. In this manner, the researcher had the
opportunity to raise additional questions, to clarify certain events,
or to probe deeper regarding the event.
In order to verify these verbal reports, two other kinds of data
were utilized: publicly available information such as annual reports
and newspaper clippings, and company archival data such as minutes
from board meetings, memos, etc. In all, over 300 pages of infor-
mation were accumulated about the JV.
The interviews were semi-structured asking the participant to
reconstruct the period of time in which he was directly involved with
the JV. Questions regarding the control of the joint venture were
straightforward, such as asking about the reporting structure, how
much involvement the parent firms had in the appointment of JV managers,
the extent to which resource allocation decisions had to be approved
by the parent firms, etc. Because several people were interviewed re-
garding the same time period, alternative viewpoints about events were
identified and served as probes within the interviews.
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With the aid of a research assistant, the interviews and data were
coded to reflect a timetable for the JV incorporating any changes that
occurred, control mechanisms that were utilized, and the resulting
reactions. Any uncertainty regarding the timing of events was verified
by going back to the archival data, to the person interviewed, or to an
alternative person.
RESULTS
Because this was an exploratory study, attempts were made to deter-
mine the influencing factors on the ability of a parent firm to control
a joint venture. Content analysis of the interviews, the archival
information, and the company documents was used as the primary analytic
method. The results given are limited, and certainly subject to the
procedures used. The principle limitation concerns the problem of
generalizing to all JVs on the basis of the results from this case study.
The benefit, however, was that sequencing of events could be identified
so as to permit analysis of relationships among the variables.
INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE
CHANGING CONTEXTUAL VARIABLES
The contextual variables influence the parent firm's ability to
control the joint venture and are also influenced by the devices used
by the parent firm for control. Figure 3 shows graphically how these
contextual variables changed over time. During the first time period
1946-1953 the ease of control of the JV was somewhat mixed based on the
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Figure 3
CHANGING CONTEXTURAL VARIABLES
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-18-
analysis of the contextual variables. (See Appendix I for further
explanation of the events during the various time periods.) The struc-
ture was simple, but the JV leadership wanted independence from the
parent companies. There was a limited market with low demand and
import restrictions that limited sales and made the industry more com-
petitive.
During the next time period, the JV became more difficult to
control: the technology became more complex, the JV expanded into new
products and geographical areas, the new management was entrepre-
neurial, and the strategy was emergent. Only the environment of high
growth provided opportunities for ease of control of the JV.
The third period, 1965-1972, again represents a time when the con-
textual variables indicated that the joint venture would be difficult
to control. Even though there was a change in the equity position of
the focal parent firm PC, it still had difficulty controlling; the joint
venture. The complex contextual conditions from the prior period con-
tinued to exist, and the environment was more uncertain and complex.
Within the final period, we find the control devices of the parent
firm PC having some impact and also the other contextual factors con-
verging to make the JV easier to control. The environment was more
predictable with competitors but stable, slow growth. The strategy was
simpler than in previous periods with fewer products and markets.
The analysis of the contextual variable visually suggests that
the JV was difficult to control for most of its life, but was easier to
control during the last period. Our concern is, thus, centered on the
first three periods to determine what lead to the JV's ease of control.
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Given chis initial analysis, one wonders about the desire to control
the JV by PC and the other parents, whether this desire changed over
time, and what control devices resulted in impacting the control of the
JV in the last period.
PARENTAL DESIRE FOR CONTROL
Most literature on joint venturing addresses parental motivations
only at the time of formation of the JV. Only recently have researchers
begun to look at how these motivations change over time (Harrigan,
1985; Schaan, 1984). It seems obvious that as conditions change for the
parent firm, so will its desire to control the JV and to be directly
involved in it. Desire for control was defined as low, medium or high
and was measured by independent rankings by three people for the four
time periods. Consensus was reached about the categories presented.
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE
Table I summarizes the changing motivations for involvement and
control. This shows three primary agents influencing the JV. The first
is the corporate level staff within PC. The second agent who became
influencial over tine was the product areas with PC. The third were the
other partner firms who are grouped together because they shared similar
goals and orientations and acted as a group.
Initially PC did not want to control the JV, but over time dif-
ferences within PC occurred. The finn became more diversified, and the
visibility of the JV at the corporate level was reduced. PC's President
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TABLE 1
PARENTAL
CHANGING DESIRE
FOR CONTROL
1953-1953 1954-1962 1963-1972 1973-1978
PC
-
CORPORATE
PRODUCT
AREAS
LOW
LOW
MODERATE
LOW
LOW
HIGH
HIGH
HIGH
PARTNERS HIGH LOW MODERATE LOW
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who had been very actively involved in setting up the JV and who was a
good friend of the JV manager became less involved as PC diversified
and reorganized.
PC's product areas became more involved as the JV became more
visible by successfully manufacturing and selling their products.
Nonetheless, the product areas never wanted to be involved in managing
the JV: they just wanted to control it. This led to mixed motives
within PC. Conflict emerged as the product areas saw opportunities
for themselves in Europe, but these seemed to be restrained by the
existence of the JV. Their desire to control the JV increased dramati-
cally in the third period, and they pushed PC for more control of the
JV. One ex-president of the JV remarked about this:
I didn't realize how much control they would try to
exercise. In view of the fact that we had done so well over
the years. In the 16 years that I was there, I think we had
only one year that we lost money and that was really a
situation brought on by an economic dip.
The changing desire for control also created conflict within PC in
the third period as well as conflict with the JV.
When PC did take over and exercise considerable authority, it
created quite a conflict. We had one executive that would
stick up for our program. He understood our program. He was
the fellow in charge of the overseas. He was forced to
retire early.
Another manager said:
The JV had rights to manufacture PC products and to sell them
also. The product division made an appeal to the executive
vice-president to have that product line taken out of the JV
and put in a separate manufacturing plant with its own inde-
pendent management in Europe.
In the first period, one of the partners had a hidden agenda to
take over control of the JV. Thus there were mixed motives initially
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among the partner firms. PC reacted by taking actions that increased
its own desire to control in the second period.
The partners in the second period had a low desire to control the
JV but a high desire to be involved. They were happy with Casey as
the JV President: The autonomy of the JV was fine with them. Casey
encouraged them to be involved by developing a "club" atmosphere to
the board meetings. The board members got to know each other per-
sonally. They acknowledged the importance of the JV to their own
businesses and their satisfaction with the way it was being run.
Their objectives were being met. They weren't looking for
an extensive return on their initial investment which was
very low. Their goals were to get a reliable product locally
manufactured.
The reason why the partners were willing to sell part of their equity
position was because they were content with the way the JV was being
run and because "PC wanted to develop the business but we didn't."
One ex-board member said:
The Americans wanted to control everything. This particular
business line was not the partners' main line: they were
happy with the service they were getting. If they bought out
PC, they would have to run the JV, and they weren't willing
to do that.
However, in the third period, as the partners were being pressured
by PC to be less involved and as they saw themselves losing control,
their desire to control the JV increased. This created conflict
between PC and the other partners. The partners found themselves com-
peting- directly with the JV as changes were made in the JV's strategy
to broaden its product line and markets.
In the last period, there continued to be mixed motives within PC
and the other partners. In PC the mixed motives were verbalized by a
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number of upper management with direct experience in the joint venture
who felt that PC should not take total control of the JV. They felt
that the continued relationship with the partners would benefit
everyone and that there was no reason to gain 100% control. But a
change in corporate attitude occurred that led to a high desire for
control of JVs in general. One corporate manager said, "My experience
is that we want to exert control in these joint ventures—management
control. It is true today—irrespective of whether we are in a
minority position."
On the other hand, external events influenced the partners' desire
to control. The other original American partner attempted to buy its
licensees, and "they were being assailed for antitrust violations." As
a result, they lost interest in the JV and limited the licensing program.
IMPACT OF CONTROL DEVICES
The control devices used by PC were coded and evaluated in terms
of their effectiveness for gaining control over the JV. Table 2 sum-
marizes these. It indicates the frequency with which each control
device was used within each time and its impact. Devices for control-
ling the management were used most frequently, then control of resources.
Control through the Board of Directors was used less frequently but
generally had a positive impact on increasing the control of PC over
the JV.
During the second time period, PC attempted many different ways of
gaining more control, but these devices did not have a strong impact
until the last period. Attempts to control through the Board of
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Directors generally had a positive effect, but note that control
through the official documents was not used. Selection and Socializa-
tion of the Management proved to be effective; however, Agenda Setting
with the Management was not effective and in fact had a negative effect.
One of the unexpected effects was that it let the JV management know
ahead of time what PC intended to do and gave the management time to
build a contradictory case.
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE
It should also be noted that although control through expertise
is rated as positive, this did not prove to be particularly influential.
The overall effect was to help PC gain control, but it worked more in
conjunction with other control devices.
The timing of some of the devices should also be noted. Within
the first time period. Selection and Control through People were used.
These proved to be a valuable foundation for the devices that were
used in later time periods. By having PC people in place, it helped
to influence the impact of devices later on.
IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
Based on the substantial theoretical literature on control, the
parent firms should utilize control devices that are well thought out
and that aim to influence certain factors of the joint venture. The
variables identified in the literature (contextual variables, desire
for control, and control devices), were studied from the viewpoint of
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TABLE 2
IMPACT OF PC CONTROL DEVICES
Frequency by time period
1946-1953 1954-1962 1963-1972 1973-1978
Freq. Impact Freq. Impact Freq. Impact Freq. Impact
Control through
Board of Directors
A. Number of votes
B. Agenda
C. Official
Documents and
Formal Reports
4
8
3(+), (-)
8( + )
2 2(+)
Control through
Management
A. Selection
B. Socialization
C. Rewards
D. Agenda
3 3( + )
1
5
2
2
6
(0)
5(+)
2( + )
2( + )
4(-), 2(+)
1
6
( + )
(-), 5(+)
1
2
1
( + )
2( + )
( + )
Control through
Resources
A. Monies
B. Expertise
C. People/Time 2 2( + )
2
9
4
(0), (-)
8(+), (-)
4( + )
2
3
2( + )
3( + )
3 3( + )
TOTAL 5 5( + ) 43 6(-)
3(0)
34(+)
12 l(-)
11( + )
9 9( + )
Code : + positive impact
negative impact
no impact
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Glaser and Strauss (1967) to determine whether the existing literature
had relevance for joint ventures and whether the interrelationships
could be defined. The validity of the theoretical explanations pre-
sented in this paper should be explored further. However, this pre-
liminary study shows that much of the control literature does not deal
with how to control a subsidiary or a joint venture: it is about
controlling operational levels of the organization. Consequently in
attempting to analyze how a parent firm controls a joint venture, this
study is truly exploring new areas and new theoretical models need to
be developed.
What is apparent is that the parent company did not have a well-
thought out strategy for controlling the joint venture. Instead what
we find is that the control strategy emerged over time, and it resulted
in surprises for the parent firms and for the joint venture management.
Implied and explicit expectations were not met because of the changing
desire for control by the parent firm PC. In fact much of the chang-
ing desire for control was caused by the changing of decision-making
responsibility for the joint venture within PC: As it shifted from
the corporate level to the product level, we find that operational
concerns drove out the strategic concerns. The product area was most
concerned about its own sales and products rather than broader stra-
tegic issues such as the impact of the joint venture on the industry
or on other PC activities. Within PC, no one was overseeing the whole
process. Changing motivations and mixed goals created conflicts on
the part of the .TV management and partners who felt that the rules of
the game had changed.
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There appears to be a diffusion effect of the control devices used,
such that the devices used first served as a foundation for gaining
control later. Thus, control through selection and socialization
(within the first period) proved important control mechanisms in
later periods. Control through the Board of Directors was important
but seemed to be somewhat neutralized by a strong, entrepreneurial JV
manager. There were few devices that were used to control the JV
manager except selection. The parent firm seemed to be at a loss
regarding how to control an entrepreneurial manager, short of removing
him. Structuring devices appear to be only marginally successful as a
true control device: they are good for reporting information but not
for influencing JV behavior.
Few control devices attempted to influence the environment which
was an important contextual variable that the parent firm did not
recognize. For example, maintaining the JV might have increased demand
within the industry and improved PC's customer relations. Consequently,
it is not possible to theoretically discuss the relationship between
the control devir.es and the environment.
INSERT FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE
In order to understand what the variables mean and what relation-
ships exist. Figure A was developed to show theoretically the relation-
ship between perceived success, actual control, and parental desire for
control. Control influences whether a joint venture is perceived as
successful by the parent company. This particular joint venture had an
AMOUNT OF
ACTUAL
PARENTAL
CONTROL
A\
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FIGURE 4
JV SUCCESS AND PARENTAL DESIRE FOR CONTROL
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-29-
average 17% return on earnings throughout its life and it regularly
paid dividends. However at times, it was not viewed by PC as success-
ful because PC had a strong desire to control the JV but low actual
control. Figure 4 shows that when desire for control matches the amount
of control, the JV is viewed as successful. In these cases, there will
be a push for decentralization within the parent firm. However when
there is a mismatch, the JV will not be viewed as successful and there
will be a push for centralization ^d.thin the parent firm.
The findings of this study shed preliminary light on issues regard-
ing the parental control of joint ventures. One finding that has be-
come apparent is the predisposition of the parent firm toward wanting
more control, and this may in fact be detrimental to the joint ven-
ture's ability to fulfill its mission. The benefits of high control
to the parent firm include controlling the direction of the joint ven-
ture and controlling the profits earned. Nonetheless, there are also
benefits to be gained by minimizing the parental influence on the
joint venture. These are the entrepreneurial spirit of the JV, the
potential for innovation and technology development, the enhancement
of the image of the parent firm as a cooperative partner, and the
continuation of the relationship with the partner firms. Consequently
the dilemma still exists: designing a joint venture that is easy to
control (few functions, one location, passive management, and tight
controls) limits its long term growth potential, possible synergies,
future growth, and innovation.
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Appendix T
European Industrial Manufacturing (EIM)
An International Joint Venture
1946-195 3 EMERGENT PERIOD
The European JV was formed in 1946 by three American firms (AMC,
25%; PC, 25%; Green, 12%) and four European firms (9.5% each). The
European firms were licensees of AMC, and the expectation was that the
JV would supply a quality, locally produced machine exclusively for
them. The total initial investment of $1 million bought an existing
facility. The partners were not as interested in the joint venture
being profitable as they were in its supplying a locally produced,
quality product.
Technology: Three product lines were produced initially. One
was sold exclusively to the European owners and was under a license of
AMC. Another product line had been produced in the factory before the
war and the third line was brought in to fill up capacity and was
licensed from PC. The type of technology used was a job shop in
which each machine had to be individually designed according to the
customer's needs. One manager said: "It's not a very highly protec-
tive technology. It's more a matter of know-how manufacturing exper-
ience, application knowledge, and that kind of thing. It's not high
sophisticated technology."
Structure: The firm had about 920 people, of which about 125 were
apprentices. It was located in one location and was basically a one-
man show. It involved manufacturing, sales, and service.
Environment: Right after the war, no one was certain what would
happen to European industries. Each country had its own regulations
making exporting difficult. The market was immature and slow growing.
Strategy: The strategy was to produce a high quality machine that
would be sold exclusively to the licensees of AMC. Other products
would be produced primarily to keep the factory working to capacity.
Loans were acquired from banks for $3 million and from the parents for
$500,000. The JV was expected to pay dividends and royalty fees.
Leadership: Belraan, the president of the company was from one of
the licensee companies and was the person responsible for putting to-
gether the joint venture. The general manager was from the Dutch Com-
pany and the auditor was from PC. It was later believed by the
partners that Belman intended to take over 100% ownership as soon as
he could and that he was not committed to the JV success.
EIM Summary: The ability to control the JV based on the design
factors indicate that the JV was only moderately controllable. The
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technology, the uncertain environment, and the mixed motives of the
leadership indicated that the joint venture might be hard to control.
PC: This was the first joint venture of PC although it did have
two other overseas operations. The chairman was personally involved
in setting up the JV which had a lot of visibility at home. PC
thought the JV was a good opportunity to be ready for Europe's
recovery. At formation, there appeared to be little desire on PC's
part to have control of the JV.
1954-1962 GAINING CONTROL FROM OTHER PARENTS
During this period, Belman was removed from power and Casey, a PC
research engineer, was made President. The JV was having troubles
repaying its loans, and Casey worked to turn the JV around which he
was able to do within three years including paying off the loans.
Casey was chosen as President since the largest volume of business the
JV could expect to generate was from PC related products. Its profit
after tax for this period was about 17% and it maintained dividend
payments. In 1960, PC extended an offer and was successful at
increasing its equity position from 25% to 75%.
Technology: The basic job shop approach was retained but new
products and product lines were added that were not part of the
original agreement. These were under license from PC and other
American firms that were not JV partners. EIM used its research and
design staff to modify the machines for its European customers. In
many cases the EIM design was judged superior to the original.
Structure: Casey included several sales and production offices
during this time period. Consequently the JV wholly owned four oper-
ations outside of its host country. It moved toward product diversi-
fication.
Environment: The European industrial environment was good, and
growth occurred. The EEC was formed. The environment was slowly
growing with few competitors, and was stable.
Strategy: EIM attempted to avoid layoffs by keeping its plant at
full capacity by making many different machines. It sometimes acted as
a European sales agent for PC. It started to compete directly with
British Company with an EIM technologically superior product.
Leadership: Casey had an entrepreneur's outlook, and he personally
supervised the product diversification and growth of EIM. He steadily
expanded EIM's product and market scope and if any of the partners
objected, he was skillful at getting the other owners to side with him.
Casey felt that if he could increase PC's equity position, he would
have more freedom to continue with his product diversification strategy.
He encouraged the EIM personnel to think of themselves as a separate
business and to develope its own culture.
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EIM Summary: PC's equity position increase meant it had achieved
gaining control over its partners. However, the JV was becoming more
independent through increased product lines, increased technological
expertise, several locations, and its own culture.
PC: PC was experiencing growth in its home markets and abroad.
EIM was losing its visibility and now reported to an International
Division: the PC President was no longer as actively involved al-
though it was due to the President's personal negotiations that the
equity change occurred. I'fhen EIM requests were made for help in rede-
signing products for the European customers, EIM was led to believe
that they would have to do it themselves. PC's strategy was diversi-
fication and the business line in which EIM was placed accounted for
about 30% of corporate sales.
1963-1972 CONTROL OF THE JV
The partners continue to exert some influence over EIM's future by
voting on the board and buying EIM's products. The major issue during
this time period was EIM's independent strategy. In 1970 Casey was
transferred back to PC, and another PC manager was brought in. By
this time EIM was competing directly with AMC, PC, British Co. and
Dutch Co.
Technology: EIM's technical expertise continues to produce superior
products. AMC buys machines from them to import into the American
market. Casey gets PC's royalty payments reduced on some products
and negotiates to have PC pay the JV royalty payments on other
product lines. EIM develops new machinery.
Structure: The structure retrenched from last period since the
French operation was closed.
Environment: The European industrial environment was becoming
more mature aid more competitive. AMC purchased the Dutch Co. but was
under antitrust scrutiny.
Strategy: Product diversification proved to be less successful as
a strategy during this period. Although EIM thought of itself as the
exclusive European sales agent for PC, PC felt EIM did not have the
expertise to sell and service all of its varied products.
Leadership: Casey continues to fight for EIM's self-determination
by arguing that PC does not understand the European business environ-
ment. In 1970, the new President was willing to comply with PC's
desires.
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